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This paper proves that the feedback controls synthesizing the equilibrium 
solutions to linear quadratic differential games possess certain stability charac- 
teristics. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
In [I] Lukes and Russell studied a class of many player nonzero-sum 
linear games in Hilbert space with quadratic cost functionals. Then they 
applied their abstract theory to a class of differential games, obtaining results 
concerning the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium solution. 
Using a Hamilton-Jacobi approach they also obtained a feedback synthesis 
of the solution to the differential games. The purpose of the present article 
is to develop appropriate differential inequalities in order to prove that these 
feedback controls possess certain stability characteristics. 
Theorems I.1 and 1.2 discuss the convergence of the solutions to two 
infinite systems of differential equations, the former with two point boundary 
data and the latter with one point boundary data. Whereas convergence 
takes place on any compact interval for the systems with one point data, an 
example shows that when two such systems are coupled to produce a two 
point problem, the interval of convergence may have to become small. 
* Supported partly by NSF grant GP-8914. 
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The above theorems are applied in Section 2 to study the stability of 
differential games played repeatedly on a fixed time interval. Roughly 
speaking, Theorem 2.1 says that if the time interval is sufficiently short, then 
whenever the game is disturbed from equilibrium, it will eventually return 
to equilibrium for the situation in which one or more players play minimizing 
control commands against the remaining players’ equilibrium synthesizing 
feedback controls. Theorem 2.2 says that if all players play equilibrium 
synthesizing feedback then the game will return to equilibrium regardless 
of the size of the interval. 
1. Two INFINITE SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENTIAL INEQUALITIES 
The following result is useful in the proofs of the theorems to follow. 
It appears in G. H. Hardy, “Divergent Series,” Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1949, p. 64, but for completeness we give a short proof. 
LEMMA 1 .l. Let (uk} and {bk} be two sequences of nonnegative numbers such 
that lim,,, uR = 0 and CF=, b, = B < 03. Then 
Proof. Let A = sup{@, : K > l} and E > 0 be arbitrary. Choose M so 
large that 
ak < & for all k > M. 
Then choose N > M so large that 
i=k-M 
for all k > N. 
For n >, N we then have 
f akbn-k+l = (4, f ... + a.d,-M+l) f (aM+A-, + 
k=l 
< A(b% + .a- + bn--M+l) + & @n--M + ‘.* 
<;+;=c, 
and since E was arbitrary the result is proved. 
**a + a,$,) 
t 4) 
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THEOREM 1.1. Let [T,, , TJ be a compact subinterval of R1 and 
Fk : [T, , TJ x Rzm x R2” + RW, (1.1) 
G, : [T, , TJ x R2” x R2” -+ R”, (k = 1, 2,...) w 
be continuous maps for which there exist nonnegative numbers ct, fk(k = 1,2,...) 
such that fk + 0 as k ---f co and 
I F& xz 3 xl 3 yz ,YI)I G 4 x2 I + I XI I + 1~2 I + 1~1 I) +fk , 
I W, x2 3 Xl 2 Y2 3 YJ G 4 Xl I + I Y2 I + I Yl I) +f7c ,
for all t, x2~~1~Y2~Yl- 
If t, E [T, , TJ satisfies the inequality 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
CT1 - 44 expb(Tl - to)1 < c1 + a;c2 + aI (1.5) 
and x*(t), yk(t)(k = 0, l,...) is a continuous solution on [t,, , TJ to the dz~erentiul 
system 
*k = Fk(t, xk , xk-l , yk , Yk-1 ) xk@O) = o , (1.6) 
jk = Gk(t, xk , xk-l > Yk 3 Yk-11, Yk(T,) = 0 (k = 1, 2,...), (1.7) 
then I xk(t)l + / yk( t)I converges uniformly to zero on [tO , TJ as k -+ 00. 
Proof. We let t, , xk(t) and yk(t) satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1.1 
and denote the respective maxima of / xk(t)l and I yk(t)l over [to, TJ by 
II xk 11, jlyk ll(k = 0, I,...). Integrating (1.6) along the given solution and 
using (1.3) we have 
1 xk(t)l < [d/ xk-I I/ + II Yk I/ + 11 yk-111) +fd Tl - t,> + a jlo I xk(o)I do. 
(1.8) 
By applying Gronwall’s Lemma [2, p. 371 to (1.8) we see that 
I s@)l < b(II xk-l /I + /I Yk iI + //Y&l iI> +fkl TeaT (1.9) 
for all t E [to, T,], where T = TI - t, , and thus we obtain the estimate 
11 xk iI < bII xk-l II + llyk II + II Yk--1 11) +fkl TemT (1.10) 
(k = 1, 2,...). In a similar manner it follows from (1.4) and (1.7) that 
I/ Yk /I < b(II xk-l 11 + 11 Yk-1 11) +fk] Tear (1.11) 
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(k = 1, 2,...). Th en we eliminate ]lyk /I from (1.10) by means of (1.11) and 
thus compute 
11 xk 11 < b(II xk-l 11 + II Yk-1 11) +fkl Te”T 
+ [dli xk-l iI + iI Yk-1 11) +fkl aT2e2aT 
= [(a + a2TeET)(II kl II -I- llyk-1 II) -I (1 f aTeaT>fkl Tear. (1.12) 
From (l.ll), (1.12) and (1.5) we get 
11 xk /I + 11 yk I/ < b(2 + aTeaT)(II xk-l 11 + IIYk-1 11) + (2 -b a>fkl RET 
d [(iI xk-l 11 + 11 Yk-l ii> +fkl(l + a)(2 + a) TeaTe (1s13) 
By letting zk = II xk I/ + llyk 11 we are able to rewrite (1.13) as 
xk < bk-1 +fkl T (1.14) 
where T = (1 + 01)(2 + a) Te”lT < 1. A n easy inductive argument shows 
that 
0 < Xk = z07k--1 + ,fp+? (1.15) 
We wish to prove that zk -+ 0 as Iz -+ 00. It is sufficient to show that 
ifi~k-i+l-O as k+ co. (1.16) 
But (1.16) follows from an obvious application of Lemma 1.1 and the proof 
is complete. 
Remark 1.1. We shall be interested in applying Theorem 1.1 to linear 
systems of the general form 
3ik = Al@) xk + A2(t) xk-l + A&j Yk + A4(t) Yk-1 + fkb% 
xk(t,,) = 0 (1.17) 
and 
jk = A&J Yk + A,(t) Yk-1 + &) xk-l + gk($ 
Yk@l) = o (k = 1, 2,...), (1.18) 
where the A,(t)(i = 1, 2,..., 7) are continuous matrix functions on the 
compact interval [to , tJ, and Ifk(t)j, I gk(t)l converge to zero uniformly 
on [t,, , tl] as k + cc. Therefore to apply Theorem 1.1 we could select 
01= i max II 4f>ll, 
i-1 w11 
fk = E”tI;l (Ifk@>l + 1 gk,(t)b 
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Of course our estimate of the interval of convergence is not very sharp and 
could be improved for specific examples. 
The following example shows that (1.5) is not superfluous. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider 
kk=Xk-l+Yk+fk, x,(O)=0 (1.19) 
and 
jk = -xk-l , Yk(tl) = o (k = I, 2,...), (1.20) 
where x,(t) = 0 on [0, t,]; fi = 8 and fk = 0 for k = 2, 3 ,... . 
Note that this system has a unique solution which according to Theorem 1.1 
will converge uniformly to zero on [0, ti] if t, < 0.14. Sharper estimates can 
be made showing that convergence occurs for t, < 1.14. The following 
argument shows that the solution diverges for 1.32 < t, < 2. Defining /3 as 
t,” + t13(t, + 8) 
P= 3 4 
we see that 1 < /3 < 3 for 1.32 < t, < 2 and that t!? is a solution to 
Rewriting (1.19) and (1.20) as 
(1.21) 
(1.22) 
X&) = 1: [xk-l(T) + j:’ xk-l(“) du Tfk] dT (1.23) 
(k = 1, 2,...), we have 
t2 t3 
xl(t) = 8t 3 P + 2? - r 
for 0 < t < t, , 1.32 < t, < 2. 
If we assume the induction hypothesis 
t2 t3 
Xk@) 3 P”t + 8”-’ 3 - Pk-l 3 
then 
(1.24) 
(1.25) 
Xk+l(t) > 1: [/3% + (p-1 ; - p-1 $) + (/3k g + p-1 5 - p-1 $) 
LINEAR QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 517 
Hence from (1.22) and the restriction 0 < t < 2, it follows that 
(1.26) 
t2 t” 
= Sk+9 + p” 3 - rsk 3, 
and the induction is complete. 
Since we restrict 0 < t < 2, it is clear from (1.25) that xk(t) > B”t + CO 
as k --+ 00 for all 0 < t < t, , 1.32 < t, < 2, and hence xk(t) converges to 
+q- 
THEOREM 1.2. Let [T,, , Tl] be a conpact subinterval of R1 and let 
F,: [T,, Tl] x R3”-+W (1.27) 
(k = 2, 3,...) be continuous maps for which there exist numbers 01 > 0, fk > 0 
(k = 2, 3,...) such that fk + 0 as k + oc, and 
/ Fic(t, X3 , X2 9 xl>1 < a(I x3 1 + I x2 I + / x1 I> +fk (1.28) 
for all t, xS , x2 , x1 . If xk(t)(k = 0, I,...) is a continuous solution on [T, , TJ 
to the d$ferential system 
ff, = Fk(t, xk , xk-1, xk-2), Xk(To) = xko (k = 2, 3,...) (1.29) 
in which 1 xko I -+ 0 as k --f 00 then I xk(t)l converges uniformZy to zero on 
[To , TJ as k + 0~). 
Proof. We shall use a form of Gronwall’s Lemma whose proof we leave 
as an easy exercise for the reader. It states that, with real numbers 0, a > 0 
and continuous real function r(t) given, any continuous solution 8(t) to the 
inequality 
(1.30) 
on a compact interval [to , tl] will also satisfy the inequality 
8(t) < ea(t-to)8 + 
I 
t eatteT)r(T) d7 (1.31) 
to 
on PO ,4. 
Assuming the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2 we now proceed with the proof. 
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Let 01~ = 1 xx(T,,)i (k = 0, I,...) an c d h oose a number M sufficiently large 
such that 1 xi(t)1 < M for all t E [T,, , T,], (i = 0, 1). Then we define 
A2 = 2aMff2, &=aaz+~M+f2, (1.32) 
A, = 4-+1 + ak-2) +fk > (k = 4,5,.-k (1.33) 
Pl = 2h2 f (1.34) 
and 
pk = max 
[ 
Pk-l ) A, ) 2 1 (k = 2, 3,...). (1.35) 
Since we are given 01~ - 0 and fk - 0 as k - co, it is clear from (1.33) 
that A, -G 0 as k ---+ co. To show that, as a consequence, /& ---f 0 as k --f co, 
select arbitrary E > 0 and corresponding K = K, large so that A, < E for all 
k > K. Using induction we now establish the inequality 
for k = 1, 2,... . (1.36) 
Substituting k = K + 1 into (1.35) we compute 
PKfl = max [!j, hK+1] < max [+, ~1 (1.37) 
which shows (1.36) holds for k = 1. Now assume (1.36) holds for k fixed. 
Using (1.35) and (1.36) we further compute 
P K+k+l = max B Kik h 2 ) Kfk+l 1 
= max max 
[ ( -&-,$-),<I <max[&-,.], (1.38) 
which completes the inductive proof of (1.36). Hence pK+, < E for all 
k >, K + log[(/IK+J/E] and since E was arbitrary we conclude that /Ik d 0 
ask+co. 
From (1.35) we note the following obvious but useful properties of the flk 
for k = 2, 3,... 
(1.39) 
(1.W 
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and 
(1.41) 
With the above preparation we can now derive the following basic estimate 
of the given solution to (1.29) using induction. 
edt-To) 
I XkWl -G -y- I OIO1k + Pk[3$ - T~)] + *** + P2 [3a~k;‘$k-‘1 (1.42) 
for all t E [Ts, TJ, (k = 2, 3 ,... ). 
In order to estimate 1 x,(t)1 we integrate (1.29) along the given solution with 
k = 2 and apply (1.28) to get 
I x2(01 < % + j” [4I 441 + I %(4I + I %(~)I) +j21 A- 
TO 
< 012 + 
s 
1, [a I x2(41 + (2aJ’J + f2)l d7. (1.43) 
Applying Gronwall’s Lemma as described by (1.30) and (1.31) to (1.43), and 
using (1.32), (1.39) with R = 2 we have 
/ x,(t)1 < eU(t-To)a2 f t eorct-T)(2aM +fi) dT 
TO 
< ear&T,,) 
a2 + ea(t-T0)h2(t - To) 
This proves (1.42) for k = 2. A similar procedure using (1.44) gives the 
estimate (1.42) for k = 3. 
Now assume that (1.42) holds for 12 = 2, 3,..., n > 3. Again we estimate, 
using (1.28) and (1.29), 
I %+,(4l G %I+1 + j-lo b(I %a+dT)1 + 1 %&)I + 1 %-I(~)I) +fn+ll dT (1.45) 
and with Gronwall’s Lemma get 
I x,+,(t)1 G ea(t-To)s+l +s @-?a(1 %(~)l -I- 1 %--1(~)1) +fn+J d7. (1.46) TO 
520 LUKES AND STRAUSS 
Continuing the estimate of the integrand in (1.46) for T,, < 7 < t < Tl 
by means of (1.42) with k = n, n - 1 gives 
e”V4 441 + I xA~>l> +.fd 
. ..e < ‘@-‘o) 
I 
OL(Y~ + &[3+ - To) + .a. + ,k?:, ‘3”;n-p’$1n-1 
+ a~-1 + A-,[34T - ToI1 + *a* + 82 [3a(;n:;;ln-r +&+I/ 
= eu(t-To) 034~ + s-d + fn+J + (I% + P,d3+ - ToI 
+ (L1 + A-2) [3a(T ; To)12 + -*. + (82 + 82) 
x [3c+ - To)]n-2 + p2 [34T - T,,)]“-1 
(n - 2)! I (n-l)! * (1.47) 
But with n 3 3 we can combine (1.33) and (1.39) thus getting 
b(% + %-1) +La+11 G A+, (1.48) 
which we inject into (1.47) along with (1.41) to obtain the inequality 
ea(t-s)[a(l xn(T>l + 1 Xn-~(T)l) +fn+ll 
\e < a(t-To) 
I 
3j3,+1 + 3&[34T - To)] + *** + 3/?, ‘3”;~$1n-1 1. 
(1.49) 
Substituting (1.49) into (1.46) and integrating produces the required 
inequality 
e”(t-TO) 
I %l+dtI G g I as+1 + Pn+l[Wt - ToI1 
+ p n [34t - Toll2 + . . . + p2 [W - TOP 2! ?Z! I 
(1 50) 
which completes the inductive proof of (1.42). 
If we denote max[rO,rl] 1 xk(t)l as 11 xk Ij then from (1.42) we have 
where 
k=l 
(1.51) 
ea(T1-T,,) 
fzk = - 
B k-t1 
a , 
bk = l34.1 - TOY 
k! * 
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Hence a direct application of Lemma 1.1 shows I] xnfl I] -+ 0 as n+ cg and 
the proof of Theorem 1.2 is complete. 
Remark 1.2. We shall be interested in applying Theorem 1.2 to linear 
systems of the general form 
& = A,(t) xk + A,(t) xk-l , (1.52) 
xk(tO) = 0 (k = 2, 3,...) where the A,(t)(i = 1, 2) are continuous matrix 
functions on the compact interval [t ,, , tr]. Clearly these systems are covered 
by the above theorem and we can conclude that 1 xl,(t)\ --+ 0 uniformly on 
[to, tl] as k + co. 
Remark 1.3. By using similar techniques one can prove corresponding 
theorems in which additional “lag” terms are included in (1.6), (1.7), and 
(1.29). However, in the proof of Theorem 1.1 we relied heavily upon the fact 
that x2 did not occur in the right side of (1.4). 
2. STABILITY IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
This section includes a summary of results from [l] needed for the stability 
problem treated here. However, we suggest that the reader consult that 
reference if he is interested in more background material and other related 
results. 
The data of the differential game with which we deal is given in the form 
of real matrix-valued functions A(t), E&(t), wi(t) > 0, vi(t) > 0, and real, 
finite dimensional vector-valued functions yi(t), 3x3 = 1, 2,..., n), all defined 
and continuous on a compact interval t, < t < t, . 
The dynamics of the differential game are given by the linear system 
equation in [to, tl] x Rm, 
$ = A(t)y + i Bi(t) ui 7 
i=l 
(2-l) 
in which ui is the m,-dimensional control variable under the command of the 
i-th player, Pi . Player Pi is allowed to play any real Bore1 measurable control 
command ui = q(t) satisfying 
I 
t1 
t0 1 ui(t)l” dt < ~0. (2.4 
With the initial state of the game y(t,) = y,, E Rm fixed, any such n-tuple of 
control commands u(t) = (q(t), u2(t),..., un(t)) is called an open-Zoop strategy. 
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An open-loop strategy together with the solution of (2.1) that it generates is 
called a play of the game. 
Pi determines his cost incurred in a play of the game by a functional of 
the form 
which he wishes to make small by his choice of u,(t). An open-loop strategy 
@4(t), I,,..., 4L(t>> is called an equilibrium strategy if it satisfies the 
inequalities 
C,(d, , 22, )...) 22,) < c&l, ) 6, )...) ziiel , ui , zi,+1 )..., zl,) (2.4) 
for all controls q(t) satisfying (2.2), (i = 1, 2,..., n). An equilibrium strategy 
is one of several generalizations of the notion of a minimum of a functional 
which are studied in game theory and control theory when several functionals 
are involved. Here, / u lU2 means u*Uu. 
In [l] several different sets of sufficient conditions on the matrices A(t), 
l&(t), vi(t), Wi(t), Wi (i = 1, 2 ,..., a) are given for the existence of a unique 
equilibrium strategy. Another result in [l] states that there exists a unique 
equilibrium strategy for every differential game given by (2.1)-(2.3) when 
t, - to is taken sufficiently small. 
The equilibrium strategy is shown to be computable from the formula 
z&(t) = -u;‘(t) &*(t)[Li(t) j(t) + r,(t)] (2.5) 
in which the n x n matrix functions Li(t) are given by the solution to the 
nonlinear matrix differential system 
-Li = W,(t) + A*(t)L, +LiA(t) -Li i Dj(t)Lj 
i=l 
L&,) = J& (i = 1, 2,..., rz) (2.6) 
in which oj(t) = B,(t) U;‘(t) B,*(t). Th e n-dimensional vector functions 
ri(t) are given by the solution to the vector differential system 
zi = --A”(t) 9-i +Li(t) f l7&) rj + w&>&(t) 
j=l 
r,(t,) = -rn& (i = 1, 2 ,..., a), 
(2.7) 
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and j(t) is the trajectory of (2.1) corresponding to the equilibrium strategy 
given by the solution to 
The feedback control functions 
%(4 y) = -K’(t) B,*(t)[qt) y + r,(t)] (2.9) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n) defined for all t E [to , tr], y E Rm are called a feedback synthesis 
of the open-loop equilibrium strategy, since if we substitute (2.9) into (2.1) its 
resulting solution y(t) will be identical with 5(t) and q(t,$(t)) = G,(t). 
Note that the linear form (2.9) is independent of to and y,, . 
Equilibrium strategies can arise naturally in certain games which are 
played repeatedly. Suppose that each player Pi chooses an initial open-loop 
control @(t) on [to, tl]. Then assume each player is informed of the other 
players’ choices and is required to make a second choice 221’)(t). Let him 
make it by solving the optimal control problem 
minimize C,(fir), fihr) ,..., zing,  ui , 6(& ,..., zi’,)). 
ui 
(2.10) 
This process is repeated and generates a sequence of open-loop strategies 
(iilk), ziik),..., tip)) arising from the sequence of minimizations 
minimize Ci(Qik-lJ, QL”-l) ,..., #Fin, ui , zI~$~) ,..., ZiF-l)) 
ui 
(2.11) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n). Part of the theory in [l] shows that (Zzl’), zih’),..., till”)) 
converges to an equilibrium strategy (zir , zi, ,..., tin) in the strong sense 
s 
t1 
to 
1 Zip’(t) - di(t)12 dt --f 0 (2.12) 
as k + co (i = 1, 2,..., n) if t, - to is sufficiently small, or for every compact 
interval [to , tJ if certain conditions are imposed on the data matrices A(t), 
&(t), vi(t), Wi(t), @‘i . Note that if by accident all players initially choose 
the equilibrium strategy @I) = iii then by uniqueness they will continue 
computing the equilibrium. Games for which the zij”)(t) converge are called 
stable games. We now describe the intuition in the background of a different 
but related stability problem involving the feedback controls (2.9). 
After a sufficiently large number of replays of a stable game each player 
will be playing a near equilibrium open-loop control. We point out that 
409/32/3-5 
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although each player knows what control commands were chosen by the 
other players in the previous play he is not necessarily aware of the fact that 
the other players are computing control commands by minimizing their 
cost functionals. He might not even be aware that they are using cost 
functionals. However it is conceivable that each player eventually detects 
the convergence of the al”)(t). A particularly astute player might further 
discover he can compute his control commands, no matter what be the 
initial time or state, directly from the instantaneous state of the game y(t) 
using a feedback control (2.9), and thereby save himself a considerable 
amount of computing. 
In light of the circumstances we have just described we might well find 
all players playing their feedback controls (2.9) even though they were 
ignorant of game theory and the philosophy of the other players. On the other 
hand they might all know game theory and play the feedback controls (2.9). 
which they had computed,. for the simple reason each feared being the only 
player who might not cooperate playing equilibrium and thereby increasing 
his cost. In any case it is a minor idealization to assume we find the players 
all replaying the game using feedback controls (2.9). 
Now suppose that for some reason one of the players, call him Pi , decides 
to play something other than z&(t) (which is automatically generated whenever 
all pZayers employ their feedback controls (2.9)). For example, if he didn’t 
know game theory, or did but lacked the necessary information about the 
other players, he might depart from playing his equilibrium Zii(t) for a few 
plays of the game just to see what would happen. Or he might inadvertently 
send the wrong control command due to a malfunction of his equipment in 
sensing y(t) and producing the control signals. A more subtle possibility 
would be that Pi suspects his opponents are almost as intelligent as he and 
consequently had discovered or computed feedback control functions (2.9) 
which they were using for economy in computation. By sending out something 
other than his equilibrium command he might hope to manipulate the 
control signals put out by the other players feedback controls, thereby 
lowering his own cost or penalizing his opponents by increasing their costs. 
It is possible that Pi’s departure from equilibrium while the other players 
play feedback instigates an inflationary effect in the costs and out of concern 
or even panic Pi reverts back to his policy of minimizing his cost at each 
stage. Of course the other players’ feedbacks are no longer generating the 
z&(t) but something else. We are interested in determining whether the game 
will converge back into equilibrium. We allow one or more players to depart 
from equilibrium and then revert to minimization in the manner just 
described. As we indicated in the introduction to this paper, the game will 
return to equilibrium if t, - t, is sufficiently small. In the next few paragraphs 
we present a mathematically precise description of the departure from 
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equilibrium and the controls involved in the return as stated in Theorem 2.1. 
We now develop the equations for the control commands generated in 
each play when some of the players use their equilibrium feedback controls. 
By renumbering the players we can assume players Pj(j = n, + 1, 
no + 2,..., n) use their equilibrium feedback controls. 
Assuming z&‘)( ) b g t to e iven for I # i, Pi computes u:‘)(t) by considering 
the system 
jy) = A(t) yy”’ + Bi(t) zp + i B,(t) q--l)(t) 
kl 
*i-i 
y:“‘PJ = Yo 
(2.13) 
for which he wishes to minimize the cost 
c, = s 1: [Iyl”‘(t) -~i(t)ltvd(t) + I~lk)(t)l2,,~,~] dt + Iyl”‘(tl) -$a 1%. 
(2.14) 
The solution to this optimal control problem is given by 
u’il”‘(t) = - U;l(t) B,*(t)[Qi(t) y:“‘(t) + q;“‘(t)] (2.15) 
(i = 1, 2,..., no) in which qck)(t) is the solution to the differential equation 
-q;k) = [A*(t) - Qi(t) l$t)] qik) + Qi(t) il: B,(t) Uik-‘)(t) - wi(t)$(t) 
kl 
(2.16) 
and y:“‘(t) is the solution to the differential equation obtained upon the formal 
substitution of (2.15) into (2.13). 
When Pi plays uik)(t) (i = 1, 2,... , no), the other players, Pj(j = no + 1, 
no + 2,..., n), automatically generate responses via their feedback functions 
zy(t) = -up(t) B,*(t)[L,(t) y(k)(t) + rJt)] (2.17) 
(j = no + 1, no + Z..., n) in which ytk)(t) is the trajectory through y. at 
t = to produced as the solution to the equation obtained by substituting the 
linear forms (2.17) into 
j(k) = A(t) y(k) + 5 B,(t) 24ik’(t) + i l+(t) 24;“‘. (2.18) 
Z=l z=n,+1 
THEOREM 2.1. If t, - to > 0 is chosen sz@cientZy small then in the 
repeated play of the diflerential game (2.1) in which n - no 3 Oplayersgenerate 
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control responses UP)(t) via their equilibrium synthesizing .feedback controls 
(2.17) to the minimizing control commands u!“(t) given by (2.15), the game will 
always return to equilibrium. That is, the ui”)(t) (1 = 1, 2,..., n) converge to the 
corresponding open-loop equilibrium strategies CL(t) uniformly on [to, tl] as 
k - CO and the corresponding trajectories yoC)(t) converge uniformly to the 
equilibrium trajectory y(t). 
Proof. We have already discussed the equilibrium d,(t) and must now 
develop the equations for the approximating sequences &j’)(t) generated 
according to (2.11) as an intermediate step in the proof. This will allow us to 
prove Theorem 2.1 by eventually applying Theorem 1.1. 
We carry out the proof for n, > 1 which is the situation in which not all 
players play feedback. The case n, = 0 is covered by Theorem 2.2 where the 
conclusion is stronger in the sense that t, - t, need not be small. 
Let the control commands C~.“-‘)(t) (j = 1,2,..., n) be assumed as given. 
Then Pi generates his next control command, g!‘“)(t), on [to , tl] by considering 
the system equation 
(2.19) 
and minimizing the cost 
This optimal control problem has a unique solution discussed in [l] and 
treated in detail in [3]. Its solution is computed by the formula 
ii:“‘(t) = -U;‘(t) B,*(t)[Qi(t)$qt) + qj”‘(t)] (2.21) 
in which Qi(t) is the solution of the Kalman-Riccati matrix differential 
equation 
-!& = wi(t) + A “(4 Qi + Qi4) - Qi oi(t) Qi 
Qi(td = pi 
and @j”)(t) is the solution to 
(2.22) 
-@) = [A*(t) - Qi(t) oi(t)] qik) + Qi(t) 5 B?(t) ujk-l) - wi(t)yi(t) 
j=l 
c&i 
(2.23) 
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In (2.21) $“‘(t) is the solution to the differential equation obtained upon 
formal substitution of the form (2.21) into (2.19). Thus each player Pi 
generates his control command @(t) from the z#“-l)(t) in the manner just 
described. The theory of [l] tells us that for a stable game on [t, , tr] the 
G”’ converge in the strong sense of (2.12) to the unique equilibrium zii 
described by (2.5)-(2.8). It follows from (2.19) and (2.23) that each 3:“)(t) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n) converges to the same limit s(t) and each @i’)(t) converges 
to a limit &(t), all uniformly on [to , tr], as lz + Co. Consequently it follows 
from (2.21) that &l”)(t) also converges uniformly on [to, tr] as k -+ co and the 
theory of [l] says that the limit is fiJt). The uniform convergence allows us 
to replace all terms in (2.19)-(2.21) and (2.23) by their corresponding limits. 
The cited reference derives the relation 
ii(t) = Lw - ml w + r&J (2.24) 
(i = 1, 2,..., a) which we use to rewrite (2.21) as 
qyq = -Up(t) Bi*(t)[Li(t) p’(t) + ri(t)] + Sjk)(t) (i = 1, 2,..., n) 
(2.25) 
in which we have defined 
Sjk)(t) = -U;‘(i) B,*(t)[& - Qi)(g - j;:“‘) + @ik) - I&)]. (2.26) 
Notice that ] S!“)(t)\ --f 0 uniformly on [to, ti] as k + 00 (i = 1,2,..., n). 
Subtracting corresponding equations in (2.21) and (2.15) we get 
Zi$k)(t) - uik’(t) = -U;l(t) B,*(t)[~i(t)(~:k)(t) -y;‘“‘(t)) + (d;“‘(t) - q;“‘(t))] 
(i = 1, 2 ,..., n,) (2.27) 
and then in (2.17) and (2.25) 
ii’,‘“‘(t) - q’(t) = - U;l(t) B,*(t) L,(t)[gyt) - y’“‘(t)] + y?(t) 
(j = n, + 1, n, + 2 )...) ?z). 
(2.28) 
From (2.13) and (2.19) we have 
$ [p - yy = A(t)[jy - ylk’] + qt)[fy(t) - q’(t)] 
+ 2 Eqt)[ZZ(lk--l)(t) - q-l’(t ] (i = 1, 2 )...) n,), 
1-l 
#i 
(2.29) 
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from (2.18) and (2.19) we have 
$ [jy) - p)j = A(t)[j;k) - p] + Bj(t)[tiik)(t) - 2$“)(t)] 
+ i Bz(t)[a;yt) - q’(t)] + i B,(t)[zy’(t) - q’(t)] 
1x1 I=1 
#j #j 
(j = no + 1, no + 2 ,..., n), (2.30) 
and finally from (2.16) and (2.23), we get 
- & [#k) - qik)] = [A*(t) - QJt) L?gt)][p - qy’] 
+ i B,(t)[tiy-yt) - q-l’(t)] (i = 1, 2,..., no). 
Z=l 
fi 
Substituting (2.27) and (2.28) into (2.29)-(2.31) we see that the differences 
X;“‘(t) = p(t) -y;“‘(t) (i = 1, 2,..., n,) (2.32) 
xi’k’(t) = p(t) -y’“‘(t) (j = no + 1, no + 2 ,..., n) (2.33) 
x(k).(t) = d!“‘(t) - q!“‘(t) n+z I 2 (i = 1, 2,..., n,) (2.34) 
satisfy the boundary value problems 
$k) = [A@) - q(t) $&i(t)] xp - 5 q(t) Q,(t) x~“-1) 
Z=l #i 
+ 5 B,(t) q-(t) (i = 1, 2 ,...) n,), (2.35) 
z=?zo+l 
n” ?a 
tiy = [A(t) - q(t)qt)] Xjk) - 2 O,(t) g&(t) xi”’ - c rr,(t)L,(t) xi”’ 
Z=l l=n,+l 
Zi 
(j = no + 1, no + 2 ,..., n), 
(2.36) 
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qyi = - [I* - QJ~) Z7,(t)] x;& + 2 I7Jt) Q&(t) xik-l) 
24 
fi 
(i = 1, 2,..., n,,) with boundary conditions ~j”)(t,,) = 0 (I = 1,2,..., n) and 
~$~(t~) = 0 (i = 1, 2 ,..., n,). 
If we now consider the composite vector functions 
(tZ = 1,2,...) then it is clear that (2.35)-(2.37) can be written in the form 
(1.17)-(1.18). Furthermore if we select t, - to sufficiently small then 1 fk(t)l 
and ) gk(t)l converge to zero uniformly on [to , ti] as required, since both 
1 8!“)(t)] and 1 @“-l) (t) - G\lc)(t)l then converge to zero uniformly as K + CCL 
Hence by Remark 1.1 the proof of Theorem 2.1 is completed. 
The next theorem treats the special case in Theorem 2.1 with n, = 0 
corresponding to the situation in which all 11 players generate control 
commands with their equilibrium synthesizing feedback controls. Of course 
if they did this for all plays of the game they would repeatedly reproduce 
the equilibrium commands 2ij(t). We are interested in determining what 
happens when in the first play of the game at least one player plays something 
else. This would happen, for example, if Pi generated his first control 
command as 
Up’(t) = -UTl(t) Bi*(t)[Li(t)y’O’(t) + ri(t)] (2.38) 
where y(O)(t) is any continuous function. Then, because the present state 
may not be known to each player, at least one player uses old data in his 
feedback formula. 
THEOREM 2.2. Suppose the diSferentia1 game (2.1) has an equilibrium 
solution on the interval [to , tJ and the game is played repeatedly with player 
P,(i = 1, 2,..., n) initially playing any control ui(“)(t) satisfying (2.2) and 
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thereafter generating control commands uj”)(t) with his equilibrium synthesizing 
feedback controls 
u:k+l)(t) = -up(t) Bi*(t)[L,(t)y’“‘(t) + r,(t)] (2.39) 
3’(k) = A(t) y”“’ + 1 Bi(t) u;“‘(t), YM = YrJ * (2.40) 
i=l 
Then u!‘)(t) converges to the equilibrium control &(t), and yck)(t) converges 
to the corresponding equilibrium trajectory P(t), both un$ormly on [t, , tJ as 
k-too. 
Proof. The equations for the equilibrium trajectory (2.8) are 
where 
$ = A,(t)9 + AZ(t)9 - i LQt) ri(t) 
i=l 
40 = 4th As(t) = - f Oi(t)Li(t) 
i=l 
(2.41) 
and recall oi(t) = &(t) U;‘(t) B,*(t). Substitution of (2.39) into (2.40) gives 
j(k) = Al(t)y(k) + A,(t)y+l) - z$l ai ri(t) (k = 2, 3,...). 
(2.42) 
Subtracting (2.41) and (2.42) we see that x”(t) = y(“)(t) -3(t) satisfies 
k(k) = A,(t) X(k) + l&(t) d-l), dk’(to) = 0 (k = 2, 3 ,... ). (2.43) 
Hence the completion of the proof follows from Remark 1.2. 
We conclude with the remark that in a similar manner one can show 
that the conclusion of Theorem 2.2 will hold if more lags and disturbances 
occur, e.g., replacing (2.39) by 
u!k+l)(t) = -U~l(t) B,*(t) [L,(t) ( ‘(“’ +2Y’km1’ ) + ri(t)] + fk(t) z 
(2.44) 
where ~up[~,,~,] I fk(t)l -+ 0 as k + co. 
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